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ABSTRACT
Protocols to implement a fault-tolerant computing system are described. These protocols
augment the hypervisor of a virtual machine manager to coordinate a primary virtual ma-
chine and its backup. The result is a fault-tolerant computing system that does not require
modifying the hardware, operating system, or applications programs. A prototype system
was constructed for HP’s PA-RISC instruction-set architecture. Using this prototype, engi-
neering issues and performance implications of the approach were explored.
*This material is based on work supported in part by the Office of Naval Research under contract N00014-91-J-1219,
ARPA/NSF Grant No. CCR-9014363, NASA/ARPA grant NAG-2-893, and AFOSR grant F49620-94-1-0198. Any opin-
ions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect
the views of these agencies.
**Work performed while at Cornell University.
1. Introduction
One popular scheme for implementing fault tolerance involves replicating a computation on pro-
cessors that fail independently. Replicas are coordinated so that they execute the same sequence of
instructions and produce the same results. This paper describes a novel implementation of that
scheme. We interpose a software layer between the hardware and the operating system. The result is
a fault-tolerant computing system whose implementation does not require modifications to hardware,
to the operating system, nor to any applications software.
The benefits of our approach concern engineering and time-to-market costs. We are driven by
two observations. First, a manufacturer typically will build a series of realizations for a given instruc-
tion-set architecture, where each successive realization has improved cost/performance. Second,
implementing replica coordination is subtle, whether done by hardware or software. Given these, we
note:
• When replica coordination is implemented in hardware, a design cost is incurred each time a
new realization of the architecture is produced. Because designing replica-coordination hard-
ware takes time, support for fault-tolerance necessarily lags behind the cost/performance curve.
• Implementing replica coordination in an operating system requires that the operating system be
modified. Mature operating systems are complicated, and this makes it difficult to perform the
necessary modifications. In addition, modifications must be devised for every operating system
supported by a given platform.
• If replica coordination is left to the application programmer, then the same problems must be
solved by the programmers of every application. Moreover, all of these programmers must be
acquainted with the nuances of replica coordination.
These difficulties caused us to explore alternatives to the hardware, the operating system, and the
application programs as the level for implementing replica coordination in a system.
A hypervisor is a software layer that implements virtual machines having the same instruction-
set architecture as the hardware on which the hypervisor executes. Because the virtual machine’s
instruction-set architecture is indistinguishable from the bare hardware, software run on a virtual
machine cannot tell whether a hypervisor is present. Perhaps the best known hypervisor is CP-67
[MS70], developed by IBM Corp. for 360/67 and later evolved into VM/370 [IBM72] for System 370
mainframes. Hypervisors for other machines have also been constructed [PK75] [K82]. An excellent
survey of research on virtual machines appears in [G74].
There are a variety of reasons one might employ a hypervisor. A hypervisor allows multiple
operating systems or multiple versions of the same operating system to coexist on a single (hardware)
processor. Even when virtual machines all execute the same operating system, a hypervisor provides
an isolation that simplifies protection and sharing [PK74][K82]. Our research is not concerned with
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the virtues and costs of hypervisors, though. We are concerned with the virtues and costs of augment-
ing a hypervisor to support replica coordination and, in that manner, support fault-tolerance.
Use of a hypervisor to implement replica coordination is attractive—at least, in theory. When
replica coordination is implemented in a hypervisor, it instantly becomes available to all hardware
realizations of the given instruction-set architecture, including realizations that did not exist when the
hypervisor was written. Second, when replica coordination is implemented in a hypervisor, a single
implementation suffices for every operating system that executes on that instruction-set architecture.
Finally, by implementing replica coordination in a hypervisor, the applications programmer is freed
from this task. The question, then, is whether hypervisor-based replica coordination is practical.
What is the performance penalty?
This paper describes the protocols and the performance of a prototype implementation of hyper-
visor-based fault-tolerance. In §2, we describe the protocols. These protocols ensure that the
sequence of instructions executed by two virtual machines running on different physical processors
are identical. The protocols also coordinate I/O issued by these virtual machines. Our prototype is
discussed in §3. To construct this prototype, we implemented a hypervisor for HP’s PA-RISC archi-
tecture and augmented that hypervisor with our replica coordination protocols. We report in §4 on the
performance of our prototype. In addition to discussing performance measurements, we describe the
consequences of variations that might improve performance of the prototype. Finally, §5 discusses
related work and some future research directions.
2. Replica Management Protocols
In the primary/backup approach to fault-tolerance [AD76], n processors implement a system
that can tolerate n−1 faults. One processor is designated the primary and the others are designated
backups. To obtain service, clients make requests of the primary. The primary responds to each
request and informs the backups of its actions so that a backup can take over if the primary fails.1
Our implementation of fault-tolerant virtual machines uses the primary/backup approach in the
hypervisor. A t-fault-tolerant virtual machine consists of a primary virtual machine, executed by one
processor, and t backups, each executed by other processors. The t-fault-tolerant virtual machine
continues operating as long as t or fewer of the processors experience hardware failures. Protocols
ensure that
1Notice that the primary/backup approach works only when processors exhibit failstop behavior—in response to a fail-
ure, the primary must halt and do so detectably [SS83]. Arbitrary behavior in response to a failure cannot be tolerated. To-
day’s hardware approximates the failstop model with sufficient fidelity so that the failstop assumption is reasonable unless
the system must satisfy the most stringent fault-tolerance requirements. Moreover, a single backup (i.e. n=2) usually suf-
fices, because the time to integrate a new backup into the system is typically short and, therefore, the risk of a second failure
in that interval is acceptably low.
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(1) if the primary’s processor has not failed, then backup virtual machines generate no interac-
tions with the environment, and
(2) after the primary’s processor has failed, exactly one backup virtual machine generates interac-
tions with the environment and in such a way that the environment is unaware of the pri-
mary’s failure.
The environment for a virtual machine includes the I/O devices accessible to that virtual machine.
Our protocols are for a single backup, so we implement a 1-fault-tolerant virtual machine; gen-
eralization to t-fault-tolerant virtual machines is straightforward. The protocols cause the backup vir-
tual machine to execute exactly the same sequence of instructions as the primary virtual machine,
where each instruction executed by the backup has the same effect as when it is executed by the pri-
mary. The protocols also ensure that the environment does not see an anomalous sequence of I/O
requests if the primary fails and the backup takes over while an I/O operation is in progress.
One obvious assumption, so that the backup virtual machine can take over for the primary, con-
cerns the accessibility of I/O devices:
I/O Device Accessibility Assumption: I/O devices accessible to the processor executing the
primary virtual machine are also accessible to the processor executing the backup virtual
machine.
Other assumptions, discussed below, concern the effects of executing various classes of instructions.
We ignore here the problem of replacing the backup after a failure, it being orthogonal to replica-
coordination and fairly straightforward.
2.1. Identical Instruction Streams
In our scheme, a given instruction must have the same effect whether it is executed by the pri-
mary virtual machine or the backup. This requires two assumptions about instruction execution.
Both assumptions can be satisfied by HP’s PA-RISC [HP87], DEC’s Alpha [S92], and most other
modern processors.
Define the virtual-machine state to include the memory and registers that change only with
execution of instructions by that virtual machine. Main memory, address translation registers, the
program counter, and the general-purpose registers are all part of the virtual-machine state, but a time-
of-day clock, the interval timer, I/O status registers, and the contents of I/O devices would not be. We
partition the instruction set into ordinary instructions, whose behavior is completely determined by
the virtual-machine state, and environment instructions, whose behavior is not. Examples of ordinary
instructions include those for arithmetic and data movement; examples of environment instructions
include those for reading the time-of-day clock, loading the interval timer, and for performing I/O.
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In order that the primary and backup virtual machines execute exactly the same sequence of
instructions, both virtual machines are started in the same state. We then require that every instruc-
tion have the same effect when it is executed by the primary as when it is executed by the backup. By
definition, the effects of executing ordinary instructions depend only on the virtual-machine state.
Thus, ordinary instructions can be executed directly by the hardware at the primary and backup pro-
vided:
Ordinary Instruction Assumption: Executing the same ordinary instruction on two pro-
cessors in the same virtual-machine state has exactly the same effect.
Tw o ADD instructions, for example, must calculate identical sums when given identical arguments.
The second assumption ensures that when executing an environment instruction, the hypervisor
at the primary and backup virtual machines have an opportunity to communicate. This allows both
hypervisors to change the virtual-machine state in the same way. For example, the second assumption
allows an instruction executed by the backup for reading the time-of-day clock to return the same
value as returned when that instruction was executed—perhaps at a slightly different time—by the
primary.
Environment Instruction Assumption: Environment instructions are simulated by the
hypervisor (and not executed directly by the hardware). The simulation ensures that a given
environment instruction executed on two processors in the same virtual-machine state has
exactly the same effect on the virtual-machine state.
To guarantee that the primary and backup virtual machines execute the same sequence of
instructions, we must ensure that identical interrupts are delivered to each and at the same points in
their instruction streams. The presence of a hypervisor helps. The primary’s hypervisor can forward
the I/O interrupts it receives to the backup’s hypervisor. And, the primary’s hypervisor can send to
the backup’s hypervisor information about the value of the interval timer at the processor executing
the primary virtual machine. Thus, by communicating with the primary’s hypervisor, the backup’s
hypervisor learns what interrupts it must deliver to the backup virtual machine.
However, even careful use of an interval timer cannot ensure that the hypervisor at the primary
and backup receive control at exactly the same points in a virtual machine’s instruction stream. This
is because instruction-execution timing on most modern processors is unpredictable. Yet, interrupts
must be delivered at the same points in the primary and backup virtual machine instruction streams.
We must employ some other mechanism for transferring control to the hypervisor when a virtual
machine reaches a specificed point in its instruction stream.
The recovery register on HP’s PA-RISC processors is a register that is decremented each time an
instruction completes; an interrupt is caused when the recovery register becomes negative. With a
recovery register, the hypervisor can run a virtual machine for a fixed number of instructions and then
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receive control and deliver any interrupts received and buffered during that epoch. A hypervisor that
uses the recovery register can thus ensure that epochs at the primary and backup virtual machines
each begin and end at exactly the same point in the instruction stream.
A recovery register or some similar mechanism is, therefore, assumed.
Instruction-Stream Interrupt Assumption: A mechanism is available to invoke the hyper-
visor when a specificed point in the instruction stream is reached.
In addition to the recovery register on HP’s PA-RISC, the DEC Alpha performance counters could be
adapted, as could counters for any of a variety of events [G94]. Object-code editing [LB92] [GLW95]
gives yet another way to ensure that the primary and backup hypervisors are invoked at identical
points in a virtual machine’s instruction stream. In this scheme, the object code for the kernel and all
user processes is edited so that the hypervisor is invoked periodically. Or, one can simply modify the
code-generator for a compiler to cause invocation of the hypervisor periodically whenever a program
produced by that compiler is executed.
By virtue of the Instruction-Stream Interrupt Assumption, execution of a virtual machine is par-
titioned into epochs, and corresponding epochs at the primary and the backup virtual machines com-
prise the same sequences of instructions. We hav e only to ensure that the same interrupts are deliv-
ered at the backup as at the primary when each epoch ends. The solution to this is for the primary and
backup hypervisor to communicate, and at the end of an epoch i to have the backup’s hypervisor
deliver copies of the interrupts that primary’s hypervisor delivered at the end of its epoch i.
We now summarize the protocol that ensures the primary and backup virtual machines each per-
forms the same sequence of instructions and receives the same interrupts. To simplify the exposition,
we assume that the processors executing the primary and backup are linked by FIFO communications
channels. We also assume that the processor executing the backup detects the primary’s processor
failure only after receiving the last message sent by the primary’s hypervisor (as would be the case
were timeouts used for failure detection). Counter e p is maintained by the primary’s hypervisor and
eb by the backup’s hypervisor to store the number of the epoch currently being executed by the pri-
mary and backup virtual machine respectively.
First, we treat the case where a processor running the primary virtual machine has not failed.
The protocol is formulated as a collection of hypervisor transitions. We write Tme p to denote the vir-
tual interval timers and time-of-day clocks at the processor executing the primary virtual machine and
write Tmeb for the same registers at the backup virtual machine. Each epoch, Tme p is sent to the
backup’s hypervisor so that hypervisor can resynchronize its clocks (denoted here by assignment
Tmeb : = Tme p) and thus will schedule interval timer interrupts at the end of the same epochs as the
primary’s hypervisor.
-5-
P1: If e p = E and primary’s hypervisor receives an interrupt Int:
- primary sends [E, Int] to backup
- primary buffers Int for later delivery
P2: If e p = E and the epoch ends at the primary:
- primary sends [Tme p] to backup
- primary awaits acknowledgment for all messages previously sent to backup
- primary adds to buffer any interrupts based on Tme p
- primary delivers all interrupts buffered during epoch E
- primary sends [end, E] to backup
- e p : = e p +1
- primary starts epoch E +1
P3: If backup’s hypervisor receives an interrupt Int destined for the backup virtual machine
then it ignores Int.
P4: If backup’s hypervisor receives a message [E, Int] from primary:
- backup sends an acknowledgment to the primary
- backup buffers Int for delivery at end of epoch E
P5: If eb = E and the epoch ends at the backup:
- backup awaits [Tme p] message from primary
- Tmeb : = Tme p
- backup awaits [end, E] message from primary
- backup adds to buffer interrupts based on Tmeb
- backup delivers all interrupts buffered for delivery at end of epoch E
- eb : = eb +1
- backup starts epoch E +1
Now consider the case where the processor executing the primary virtual machine fails. Sup-
pose the failure occurs after starting epoch E but before the sending (in P2) of [end, E] to the
backup’s hypervisor. Observe that the backup virtual machine will execute the portion of epoch E
that the primary executed, since the same interrupts were delivered at the backup when it started
epoch E. The backup has no obligations concerning execution after the point in epoch E where the
primary fails, so the backup can simply continue executing instructions (and continue ignoring inter-
rupts from the backup processor) until the end of epoch E. Howev er, after the backup virtual
machine reaches the end of epoch E, it will not receive the expected [end, E] message from the pri-
mary’s hypervisor. It is at this point that the backup is promoted to the role of the primary:
P6: If eb = E and the epoch ends at the backup:
- backup awaits detection of failed primary
- backup adds to buffer interrupts based on Tmeb
- backup delivers all interrupts it buffered for delivery at end of epoch E
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- eb : = eb +1
- backup is promoted to primary
- backup starts epoch E +1
It is important to understand what P1 through P6 do and do not accomplish. P1 through P6
ensure that the backup virtual machine executes the same sequence of instructions (each having the
same effect) as the primary virtual machine. P1 through P6 also ensure that if the primary virtual
machine fails, then instructions executed by the backup extend the sequence of instructions executed
by the primary. P1 through P6 do not guarantee that interrupts from I/O devices are not lost (nor is
the protocol intended to prevent lost I/O interrupts). If the processor executing the primary virtual
machine fails before successfully relaying an I/O interrupt that has been delivered to the primary’s
hypervisor, then that interrupt will be lost. The next subsection extends the protocol to cope with lost
I/O interrupts and the more general problem of ensuring that the environment does not see anomalous
behavior in response to a failure.
2.2. Interaction with an Environment
The state of the environment is affected by executing I/O instructions. We must ensure that the
sequence of I/O instructions seen by the environment is consistent with what could be observed were
a single processor in use, even though our 1-fault-tolerant virtual machine is built using two proces-
sors. The problem is best divided into two cases:
(i) epochs the primary completes without failing, and
(ii) epochs, called failover epochs, during which the primary fails.
These two cases suffice because, according to P6, the backup virtual machine is promoted to a pri-
mary for the epoch following the one in which the primary fails. So, ev ery epoch is one that the pri-
mary completes or one during which the primary fails.
Case (i) is simple—during these epochs, I/O instructions from the backup virtual machine are
suppressed by the backup’s hypervisor. Recall, due to P5, the backup virtual machine does not start
its epoch E until after the primary has completed that epoch (because the [end, E] message is
aw aited). The backup’s hypervisor therefore knows at the start of epoch E that the primary has com-
pleted this epoch without failing. The hypervisor at the backup can thus suppress I/O attempted by
the backup virtual machine during this epoch.
Case (ii) is problematic because it gives rise to an instance of the unsolvable two generals prob-
lem [G79]: No protocol can exist to inform the backup’s hypervisor about I/O attempted by the pri-
mary virtual machine if the processor executing the primary can fail. This is because sending a mes-
sage is the only way for the primary’s hypervisor to inform the backup’s hypervisor that an I/O
instruction was issued. In a protocol where the notification is sent after the I/O instruction is issued,
the primary’s failure after the I/O but before the send would cause the backup to conclude
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(erroneously) that the I/O was started; in a protocol where the notification message is sent before the
I/O instruction is issued, the primary’s failure after the send but before the I/O would cause the
backup to conclude (erroneously) that the I/O instruction was never attempted.
To handle case (ii), we exploit the reality that I/O devices are themselves subject to transient
failures and drivers already cope with these failures. All I/O devices are assumed to comply with the
following interface:
IO1: If an I/O instruction is issued and performed, then the processor issuing the instruction
receives a completion interrupt.
IO2: If the processor issuing an I/O instruction receives an uncertain interrupt, then the I/O
may or may not have been performed.
The SCSI bus used with HP’s PA-RISC machines and the I/O architecture for DEC’s Alpha both sat-
isfy these requirements, as would I/O devices accessed over a communications network. With the
SCSI bus protocol, the CHECK_CONDITION command complete interrupt status has the same
semantics as the uncertain interrupt of IO2.
An operating system’s driver for an I/O device satisfying IO1 and IO2 may have to retry I/O
instructions. Specifically, whenever an uncertain interrupt is received, a pending I/O instruction must
be repeated. The environment (i.e. I/O device) must therefore tolerate repetition of I/O instructions.
And, we exploit this tolerance in handling I/O operations issued by the primary virtual machine for
which neither a completion nor an uncertain interrupt has been relayed to the backup’s hypervisor
prior to the primary’s failure.
P7: The backup’s hypervisor generates an uncertain interrupt for every I/O operation that is
outstanding when the backup virtual machine finishes a failover epoch.
The effect of P7 is to cause certain I/O instructions to be repeated. However, as far as the envi-
ronment is concerned, this repetition might be a consequence of transient events that caused I/O
devices to return uncertain interrupts. The environment, therefore, sees a sequence of I/O instruction
that is consistent with what could be observed were a single real processor in use.
3. A Prototype System
In order to evaluate the performance implications of hypervisor-based fault-tolerance, we con-
structed a prototype. This involved implementing a hypervisor and then augmenting that hypervisor
with the protocols of §2. Our prototype consists of two HP 9000/720 processors connected by both a
SCSI bus and by an Ethernet. We chose PA-RISC processors so that a recovery register was available
to control epochs. A disk connected to the SCSI bus serves as a representative I/O device; a remote
console is attached to the Ethernet and is available for control and debugging of the system. See Fig-
ure 1.
-8-
Primary
Backup
HP 9000/720
HP 9000/720
Ethernet
Remote Console
SCSI Bus
SCSI
Disk
Figure 1. The Prototype
3.1. The Hypervisor
A hypervisor must not only implement virtual machines whose instruction-set architecture is
indistinguishable from the bare hardware, but it must do so efficiently—a virtual machine should
execute instructions at close to the speed of the hardware. Typically this is accomplished by taking
advantage of a dual mode processor architecture, whereby running in supervisor mode allows both
privileged and non-privileged instructions to be executed, but running in user mode allows only non-
privileged instructions to be executed. The hypervisor executes in supervisor mode and receives con-
trol on any incoming interrupt or trap. All other software, including the operating system kernel of
the virtual machine, executes in user mode. Whenever the virtual machine is in a virtual supervisor
mode and attempts to execute a privileged instruction, a privilege trap occurs and the hypervisor sim-
ulates the instruction.
Implementing a hypervisor for HP’s PA-RISC is not completely straightforward, however. Two
aspects of the instruction-set architecture prevent efficient virtualization: the memory architecture and
the processor’s privilege levels. Fortunately, all of the problems could be addressed by constructing a
hypervisor that supports only a single instance of a somewhat restricted virtual machine. That virtual
machine suffices for running HP’s UNIX system, HP-UX. Our hypervisor is approximately 24K lines
of code (of which 5K are assembly language and the rest are C).
Memory Architecture. On HP’s PA-RISC architecture, address translation is accomplished using a
set of space registers. These space registers define logical address segments; instructions that read the
registers are non-privileged and a subset of the space registers may even be written to using non-
privileged instructions. The hypervisor cannot intercept non-privileged accesses to the space regis-
ters. This causes problems if multiple virtual machines are to be supported, because the hypervisor
will not be invoked when a virtual machine changes the space registers. It becomes difficult to pre-
sent each virtual machine with the illusion that it alone is being executed, since a virtual machine may
-9-
discover information to the contrary in the space registers.
The problem need not be addressed if the hypervisor only supports a single virtual machine.
This, then, is what we do in our prototype. We include the hypervisor in the address space of the vir-
tual machine’s kernel. The hypervisor looks to the kernel like another operating system driver.
Because there is only a single virtual machine, the hypervisor need not be involved in storage man-
agement and changes to the space registers. The only exception is the control of the access rights for
the memory-mapped I/O pages, which the hypervisor must still control. This control is obtained by
the hypervisor intercepting and changing the access rights for these pages as they are inserted into the
TLB.
Processor Privilege Levels. HP’s PA-RISC instruction-set architecture defines four privilege levels.
Privilege level 0 is equivalent to the supervisor mode described above; lev els 1 through 3 are used to
differentiate levels of access control and do not permit execution of privileged instructions. The
probe, gate, and branch-and-link instructions reveal the current privilege level of the processor. Exe-
cution of a branch-and-link instruction, for example, causes the processor’s current privilege level to
be stored in the low-order bits of the return address. Thus, probe, gate, and banch-and-link, would
enable a virual machine to discover that its privilege level is not the same as the current privilege level
of the hardware.
We addressed this problem by analyzing the use of privilege levels and the probe, gate, and
branch-and-link instructions by HP-UX. On a bare machine, the HP-UX kernel executes at privilege
level 0 and all other HP-UX software executes at privilege level 3. Privilege levels 1 and 2 are not
used by HP-UX. In our protoype, the hypervisor executes at privilege level 0, virtual privilege level 0
is executed at real privilege level 1, and virtual privilege level 3 is executed at real privilege level 3.
This mapping of virtual privilege levels to real privilege levels works only because HP-UX does not
use all of the privilege levels. Thus, a number of problems that might be caused by the access control
architecture simply do not arise with HP-UX.
To deal with the return addresses from banch-and-link instructions, we checked all uses of this
instruction by HP-UX to see if the low-order bits of a return address were actually used. In the
assembly-language portion of the HP-UX kernel, we found a single instance during the boot sequence
where the branch and link instruction was being used as a load-position independent way of determin-
ing the current physical address. This code assumes that the low-order bits were 0 (supervisor mode),
since this code always runs in supervisor mode. A solution (hack) was to modify this code fragment
and mask out the privilege bits of the return address. For the rest of HP-UX, which is written in C
and other high-level languages, we observed that the procedure linkage routine generated by the high
level language compilers was not sensitive to the execution mode bits in the return address. Thus,
HP-UX never detects the presence of our hypervisor, although if it looked, it could.
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3.2. Replica-coordination in the Hypervisor
To augment our hypervisor with the replica-coordination protocols, we investigated whether the
various assumptions given in §2 could be satisfied.
The I/O Device Accessibility Assumption is easy to satisfy because multiple hosts may reside
on the same SCSI bus. Once bus termination considerations are resolved, the primary and backup
machines can be chained together on a single SCSI bus, allowing both to access the disk. This is
what we do.
We (as well as a number of HP engineers) were surprised to find that the Ordinary Instruction
Assumption does not hold for the HP 9000/720 processor. In the HP PA-RISC architecture, TLB
misses are handled by software. When the translation for a referenced location is not present in the
TLB, a TLB miss trap occurs. If the reference is for a page already in memory, then the required
information is read from the page table and the entry is inserted into the TLB. If, on the other hand,
the reference is for a page that is not in memory, then the page must be retrieved from secondary stor-
age; the TLB is updated (by software) once the transfer is complete.
The TLB replacement policy on our HP 9000/720 processors was non-deterministic. An identi-
cal series of location-references and TLB-insert operations at the processors running the primary and
backup virtual machines can lead to different TLB contents. Since TLB miss traps are handled by
software, differences in TLB contents become visible when a TLB miss trap occurs at one of the vir-
tual machines and not at the other.
Our solution to this problem was to have the hypervisor take over some of the TLB manage-
ment. The hypervisor intercepts TLB miss traps, performs the page table search and, if the page is
already in memory, does the TLB insert operation. Only for pages that are not already in memory
does the virtual machine software receive a TLB miss trap. Thus, it appears to the virtual machine as
if the hardware were responsible for loading TLB entries for pages that are in memory. Strictly
speaking, our hypervisor implements a virtual machine that is different from the PA-RISC instruction-
set architecture. But the difference is one that does not affect HP-UX. (However, an HP-UX release
with a bug in its TLB miss handler could be affected, because the bug might never be encountered
when run in a virtual machine but might be when run on the raw hardware.)
The Environment Instruction Assumption concerns instructions that cause I/O. HP’s PA-RISC
instruction-set architecture has memory-mapped I/O. I/O controller registers are accessed through
ordinary load and store instructions. To satisfy the Environment Instruction Assumption, our hypervi-
sor alters the access protection for the memory pages associated with these I/O controller registers so
that a load or store attempted by the virtual machine (executing in user mode) causes an access trap to
occur. The access trap causes control to be transferred to the hypervisor.
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Finally, the Instruction-Stream Interrupt Assumption is handled by using the recovery counter of
the HP PA-RISC.
4. Performance of the Prototype
Performance measurements of our prototype give insight into the practicality of the protocols.
We also formulated (and validated) mathematical models for hypervisor-based fault-tolerance, to bet-
ter understand the affects of various system parameters. Normalized performance was identified as
the figure of merit. A workload that requires N seconds on bare hardware and N ′ seconds on the pro-
totype has a normalized performance of N ′/N . Thus, a normalized performance of 1.25 for a given
workload indicates that under the prototype 25% is added to the completion time. We desire a nor-
malized performance that is as small as possible; a normalized performance of 1 is the best we might
expect.
Epoch length was our paramount concern. With short epochs, interrupts are not significantly
delayed by hypervisor buffering but the number of epochs for a given task—and the associated over-
head—is increased. With long epochs, fewer epochs transpire but hypervisor delays for interrupt
delivery may become significant.
4.1. CPU-Intensive Workload
Our first investigations concerned a CPU-intensive workload. The dominant process executed 1
million iterations of the Dhrystone 2.1 benchmark. This process was assigned the highest possible
real-time priority; epoch length was set at 4K instructions. The experiment was repeated 20 times.
The coefficient of variation for the parameters measured was less than .0012%, giving us confidence
in the validity of using their average values.
The normalized performance for this CPU-intensive workload with 4K epochs was (an abysmal)
6.50—the overhead was very high. An average of 15.12 µsec. was required for the hypervisor to sim-
ulate each privileged instruction; approximately 8 µsec. for hypervisor entry/exit and 7 µsec. for the
actual work.2 Epoch-boundary processing (i.e. rule P2) consumed an average of 442.59 µsec. This
meant that epoch boundaries added approximately 46 seconds to the the 8.8 sec. required for execut-
ing the benchmark of 4. 2×108 instructions.
By increasing the epoch length, we reduce the total amount of time devoted to epoch-boundary
processing. The normalized performance NPC (EL) for the CPU-intensive workload as a function of
epoch-length EL can be approximated by the following:
2The HP 9000/720 on which these experiments were performed is a 50 MIPS processor, so a typical instruction should
execute in .02 µsec.
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NPC (EL): 1 +
1
RT
(nsim hsim +
VI
EL
hepoch + Cother (EL))
where
RT : real time required to execute workload on bare hardware (8.8 sec.)
nsim: number of workload’s instructions simulated by hypervisor
hsim: average time for hypervisor to simulate an instruction (15.12 µsec.)
VI : number of virtual machine instructions executed for workload (4. 2×108)
hepoch: average epoch-boundary processing time (443.59 µsec.)
Cother : delays caused communication between the primary and backup
hypervisors (41 msec. was measured)
A graph of NPC (EL) for epoch length EL between 1K and 32K instructions appears as Figure
2. Also indicated on that graph are measurements for our prototype with epoch lengths 1K, 2K, 4K,
and 8K. The measurements agree with what the equation predicts, validating NPC (EL) for predicting
performance of this workload.
The graph of Figure 2 shows that normalized performance improves as epoch length increases.
When there are 32K instructions in an epoch, a normalized performance of 1.84 is predicted—a sub-
stantial improvement from the normalized performance of 6.50 that we observed for 4K epochs.
However, long epochs cause interrupt delivery to be delayed. The impact of this delay gives a  practi-
cal upper-bound for epoch length. HP-UX, for example, requires that epoch lengths not exceed
385,000 instructions, because of the way the clock is maintained by the kernel. For epoch lengths of
385,000 instructions, our model predicts a normalized performance of 1.24 for the CPU-intensive
workload. This performance would be quite acceptable, especially since the hypervisor’s simulation
of instructions accounts for .18 or the .24 overhead.3 For long epochs, then, our replica-management
scheme is responsible for adding only 6% overhead.
4.2. Input/Output Workloads
We would expect a workload in which I/O occurs to perform differently than the CPU-intensive
workload discussed above. First, I/O involves a significantly higher proportion of instructions that
must be simulated by the hypervisor. Second, there is the added overhead for transferring the result
of a disk read from the primary’s hypervisor to the backup’s hypervisor. The primary virtual machine
may not proceed until this data has been received by the backup’s hypervisor (see rule P2 of the pro-
tocol).
3Anecdotal evidence [C95] for a mature VM/370 installation places normalized performance at around 1.40. The sig-
nificantly higher cost for VM/370 is undoubtedly due to supporting multiple virtual machines as well as differences in the
workload.
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When analyzing an I/O-intensive workload involving a disk, care must be taken to ensure that
requests actually propogate beyond any buffer pools that an operating system, like HP-UX, might
maintain. For reads, we must also be careful that performance measurements are unaffected by disk-
block prefetches; for writes, we must prevent overlapping the data transfer with subsequent computa-
tion. This leads to the following I/O benchmarks. A large file is pre-allocated on the disk. Then, for
measuring the performance of reads, the benchmark randomly selects a disk block, issues a read, and
aw aits the data. This is iterated 2048 times. The benchmark for writes is analagous—a disk block is
randomly selected, a write is issued, and then the write completion is awaited. Notice that a rather
high percentage of the instructions concern I/O. These instructions will be privileged and therefore
must be simulated by the hypervisor.
We ran 20 experiments in which the write version of the I/O benchmark was executed. The
coefficient of variation for the parameters measured was less than .25% giving us confidence in the
validity of using averages. The normalized performance with 4K epochs was found to be 1.67. This
normalized peformance includes the impact of the hypervisor on the the block selection calculation
and memory-mapped I/O loads and stores to initiate the write. Therefore, we also measured the disk
write times with and without the hypervisor present. When the benchmark is executed on bare hard-
ware, a disk write takes an average of 26 msec. to complete; when the hypervisor and replica-
coordination protocols are present, a disk write takes an average of 27.8 msec. Thus, disk write per-
formance does not really suffer when epochs are length 4K. However, as we shall see, with signifi-
cantly larger epochs, interrupt delivery is delayed and disk write performance can suffer.
To measure the performance of disk reads, the read version of our I/O benchmark was used.
This experiment was also repeated 20 times. The coefficient of variation for the parameters measured
was less than 3%, giving us confidence in the validity of using their averages.4 The benchmark is not
completely successful in selecting disk blocks not in the buffer-pool—of the 2048 read requests
issued, only on average 1729 caused actual disk reads. We computed a normalized performance for
the experiments (with 4K epochs) of 2.03. Because processing a read request requires the primary’s
hypervisor to forward a copy of the data read to the backup, disk reads are expected to take signifi-
cantly longer with our replica-coordination protocols in place. When the benchmark is executed on
bare hardware, an 8K disk block read takes an average of 24.2 msec. to complete; when the hypervi-
sor and replica-coordination protocols are present, a disk read takes an average of 33.4 msec. A
10Mbps Ethernet is used in transferring the disk block from the primary to the backup; this requires 9
messages for the data and 1 message for an acknowlegement.
4This coefficient of variation is much larger than obtained with the other workloads because of the high variance asso-
ciated with processing interrupts for communications between the primary and backup hypervisor. The other workloads in-
volve considerably less communication.
-15-
Normalized performance NPW (EL) for the write version of the I/O benchmark can be approxi-
mated by:
NPW (EL):
nW (cpu(EL)+ xferW + delayW (EL))
RT
where
RT : real time required to execute workload on bare hardware
nW : number of writes (2048 for the benchmark)
cpu(EL): elapsed time required to select a disk block and initiate the
transfer of a disk block when the hypervisor is present and EL
is the epoch length.
xferW : elapsed time between initation of disk write the receipt of
the corresponding interrupt (26 msec.)
delayW (EL): elapsed time between the completion interrupt and its delivery to
the virtual machine when the epoch length is EL
And, normalized performance NPR(EL) for the read version of the I/O benchmark can be approxi-
mated by:
NPR(EL):
nR(cpu(EL)+ xferR + delayR(EL))
RT
where
RT : real time required to execute workload on bare hardware
nR: number of reads (1729 for the benchmark)
cpu(EL): elapsed time required to select a disk block and initiate the
transfer of a disk block when the hypervisor is present and EL
is the epoch length.
xferR: elapsed time between initation of disk read the receipt of
the corresponding interrupt (24.2 msec.)
delayR(EL): elapsed time between the completion interrupt and its delivery to
the virtual machine when the epoch length is EL
A graph of NPW (EL) and NPR(EL) for epoch length EL between 1K and 32K instructions appears as
Figure 3. Measurements for our prototype when executed with epoch lengths 1K, 2K, 4K, and 8K are
also marked on the graph. The measurements are each within 1.9% of what is predicted by NPW (EL)
and NPR(EL).
As with the CPU-intensive workload, longer epochs lead to better normalized performance.
This is because, in our models, the cpu(EL) term dominates. But another trend is also visible.
Increases to epoch length EL causes delayW (EL) and delayR(EL) to increase, because interrupts from
the disk are buffered by the hypervisor for a longer period. This explains the slight upward drift of
normalized performance for larger epoch lengths. In a benchmark where more computation were
done before each I/O operation, the dominance of the cpu(EL) term would ameliorate the normalized
performance. Normalized performance for the I/O workload experiments never goes as low as for the
-16-
CPU-intensive workload, because of the high precentage of hypervisor-simulated instructions in
doing I/O.
4.3. Faster Replica-Coordination
The predominant overhead for the replica-coordination procotols comes from rule P2, where the
primary’s hypervisor must await acknowledgments for all messages previously sent to the backup’s
hypervisor. This suggests that speeding-up the communication between the primary and backup pro-
cessors might improve performance. Figure 4 is a graph of normalized performance if a 155Mbps
ATM link is used for communication in place of the 10Mbps Ethernet. There is some improvement—
for epoch length 32K, normalized performance for the Ethernet is predicted to be 1.84 and normalized
performance for the ATM link is predicted to be 1.66. (This assumes I/O controller set-up time is the
same for both technologies.)
A second improvement results from appreciating that it is not strictly necessary for the pri-
mary’s hypervisor to await the acknowledgments, as required in rule P2. Suppose (i) a message sent
by the primary’s hypervisor is not delivered to the backup’s hypervisor and (ii) the primary passes
through P2 nevertheless (i.e. without waiting). Thus, it becomes possible that an interrupt Int has
been delivered to the primary virtual machine but, if there is a lost message, might never be delivered
to the backup virtual machine. The computation at the backup virtual machine, therefore, might
diverge from the primary.
Obviously, no problem occurs unless the processor executing the primary virtual machine fails.
In fact, no problem occurs even if the processor fails—provided the primary virtual machine has not
revealed to the environment that Int was processed. If the delivery of Int is not revealed to the envi-
ronment, then subsequent actions by the backup virtual machine—whatever they may be—are consis-
tent with with what could be observed were there a single processor. Thus, it suffices that the
acknowledgments formerly awaited in P2 be received prior to I/O operations by the primary virtual
machine, since I/O operations are the only way in which the state of a virtual machine is revealed to
the environment.
The modifications to the protocol of §2 are straightforward. First, in P2, the primary’s hypervi-
sor need no longer await acknowledgments for messages it sent to the backup’s hypervisor. Second,
in order to initiate an I/O operation, the primary’s hypervisor is required to have received acknowl-
edgements for all messages it has sent to the backup’s hypervisor. We performed these modifications
to the prototype and re-ran our experiments for the CPU-Instensive workload of §4.1 and the two
Input/Output workloads of §4.2. As before, the normalized performance is an average obtained for 20
runs. The results are given in Table 1. The column labeled "Old" refers to the original protocol and
"New" refers to the modified protocol.
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Workload
Epoch
Len CPU Intense Write Intense Read Intense
Old New Old New Old New
1K 22.24 11.67 1.87 1.70 2.32 1.92
2K 11.83 4.49 1.71 1.66 2.10 1.76
4K 6.50 3.21 1.67 1.66 2.03 1.72
8K 3.83 2.20 1.64 1.64 1.98 1.70
Table 1. Normalized Performance of Original and Revised Protocol
As expected, the normalized performance improves signifcantly when acknowledgements need
not be awaited in P2. The effect is most pronounced in the CPU-intensive workload, because its nor-
malized performance is most affected by the delay at epoch boundries. In the I/O intensive work-
loads, some of the delay at an epoch boundary is simply displaced to the I/O operation in each itera-
tion of the benchmark.
5. Discussion
The availability of off-the-shelf microprocessors has allowed fault-tolerant computing systems
to be constructed simply by adding support for replica-coordination to a bus or to systems software.
In some systems, like the one offered by Stratus, the same inputs are presented by the bus to the repli-
cas and the bus is driven by only a single replica (even though all replicas generate the same outputs)
[SS92]. Other systems exploit a bus to implement fault-tolerant processes on top of an operating sys-
tem. The work described in [BBG83] [BBGHO89], in [MPN92], and in [PP83] exemplify this
approach. In the pioneering work of Tandem [B81], the applications themselves are responsible for
ensuring coordination between the processes comprising a process-pair, the unit of replication there.
Despite the engineering and time-to-market costs, manufacturers do design and sell processors
that implement replica-coordination in hardware. A design from Tandem [CMJ88] and DEC’s VAXft
3000 are examples. See [SS92] for a survey of hardware-implemented fault-tolerant computing sys-
tems.
The system described in this paper is the first to implement replica-coordination above the hard-
ware but below the operating system. We augment a hypervisor to support replica-coordination.
Adding a hypervisor does have a non-trivial performance impact but, as we have shown, the addi-
tional cost of our replica-coordination protocols is not significant. And, replica-coordination becomes
available on all realizations of the instruction-set architecture and for all operating systems imple-
mented for the instruction-set architecture. Thus, our implementation of fault-tolerance is transparent
to operating systems (and their applications) as well as to hardware designers. It is difficult to
-18-
compare performance costs with the cost reductions in hardware and software design, so we do not
attempt a comparison. A new (faster) processor realization can be exploited immediately; a new oper-
ating system is made fault-tolerant trivially.
Augmenting a hypervisor is not the only way to support replica-coordination above the hard-
ware but below system software. One might modify a micro-kernel, for example, and realize many of
the same benefits as enjoyed when a hypervisor is augmented. This alternative remains to be investi-
gated. Another question we have not dealt with concerns shared memory. One might imagine virtual
processors that communicate using shared memory. For some memory models, this is not difficult to
support and it too is the subject of on-going work.
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